

VIA: \_\_\_\_\_  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGMA-32633

200-124-39/

**SECRET**

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, IO

Attn: ☐

DATE: 6 March 1958

FROM : Chief, Munich Base *an* ☐

INFO: Chief, EE  
COS, Germany

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/DTDORIC/QKACTIVE

SPECIFIC— Transmittal of Memorandum from ☐

REFERENCE: None.

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information.

1. We are attaching herewith a memorandum prepared by ☐ on the subject of positive information potential at PBCHORD. ☐

2. Attached under separate cover is an internal QKACTIVE memorandum, referred to in paragraph 1-E of ☐ memo, on the subject of criticism of BGCALLUS publications.

Approved: ☐

Attachments:

- A. Memo from ☐ - Herewith
- B. Identities - USC
- C. Internal QKACTIVE Memo - USC

Distribution:

- 3 - IO w/att A (h/w); att B (USC); att C (USC)
- 2 - EE w/ att A (h/w); att B and C (USC)
- 2 - COS/G w/att A (h/w); att B and C (USC)

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DATE 2007

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ATTACHMENT 2 TO REGMA 32633

MEMORANDUM FROM: ☐

SUBJECT : Interim Report on Positive Information Potential, PBCHORD

1. As a source of positive information, PBCHORD has a large, unexploited and partially unknown potential. The various phases of this potential will be discussed in depth in future correspondence, but are here presented briefly with the idea of giving Headquarters an overall picture of the potential as currently visualized and of some problems concerning exploitation. Primary potential lies in the following:

A. Central Research Branch: Daily monitoring of Soviet radio and publications, including TASS news service ticker and 5-Y project. Although duplicating in some respects the FBIS service, experience has shown that the final product is available with significant time advantage through the PBCHORD-PBAFFIRM telex and telephone relay to Headquarters. KUMONK representatives both at Headquarters and in Munich have indicated the value of receiving this service, particularly because speed is essential to their operation. The 5-Y project is apparently a unique service. It is currently controlled by ☐ and should remain so until some of the problems mentioned below have been resolved. It should be noted that budgetary limitations have resulted in a reduction in monitoring recently. This is a real information loss.

B. News Department: Press review and interviews. Publications are received in Munich long before they are available at Headquarters. PBCHORD needs required extraction of the most important Soviet items, and translation into English is available before such documents are even received by Iden A. However, a really valuable service could be rendered here with the addition of one man. Only superficial coverage is possible at present. Interviews with travelling Soviets in the West are a normal reporting function of this department and two or three roving correspondents, well qualified professionally and linguistically, undertake this task. Contacts are discovered through press reports, personnel contacts with emigres and government officials, tips from PBAFFIRM, and various other official and semi-official sources.

C. Audience Analysis and Program Evaluation Department: Audience Analysis furnishes letters and cards from within the Soviet Union to TPLINGO, interviews with recent emigres and defectors, travellers to the West, etc. Exploitation of large repatriate groups such as in Spain and Greece remain largely a potential because of budgetary problems. The exploitation of Greek repatriates from Central Russia promises very valuable information on an area which represents an information gap. Background reports resulting from interviews are made available to Headquarters through PBAFFIRM.

D. Emigre Relations Office: The information potential here is still unknown. Direct contact between ☐ is carried out with the knowledge and approval of ☐ primarily with reference to emigre politics rather than information of intelligence value however.

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E. BGCALLUS: As reported previously BGCALLUS publications of value are available by regular or air mail subscription and a sample of each with distribution information will be made available to Headquarters as soon as possible. The potential value of BGCALLUS, according to [ ] lies in assignment of research topics of interest, a subject which he has agreed to expand on in a separate memorandum to Headquarters. Incidentally, there has been some criticism lately of the reliability of BGCALLUS publications. One example is attached under separate cover in the form of a memorandum from [ ]

2. For several reasons [ ] present position is unsatisfactory with respect to the collection and processing of information of value to Headquarters. Although the present position has the advantage of being separated from the daily processing mill, and therefore allows some freedom of action, other problems arise. The bulk of material of value is in [ ] department, i.e. monitoring and 5-Y sources. [ ] currently is located physically in a room with two uncleared and unwitting secretaries, which means that materials must be processed at home or after hours in the office. The amount of time consumed by overt duties - namely, eight to nine hours daily, also poses a problem. Also [ ] has no overt need for some of the materials to be processed, which means a secure system must be worked out if these are to be done on a daily basis. (Since the value of much of the material lies in the speed with which these items can be made available to Headquarters, it is obvious that daily processing will be necessary.) In addition there are sources of valuable information in other sections of TPLINGO and in the other branches of PBCHORD. All of these require natural access and a secure physical environment for processing.

3. Solutions to the above problems have not been worked out at this point. The following discussion, therefore, is in the nature of suggestions only:

A. The time problem is serious. Although [ ] is willing to put in the overtime hours to process material daily for priority transmittal to Headquarters, the expense resulting hardly seems justified if other solutions are available. At present [ ] is handling all the Program Evaluation functions of the department to which he is assigned. This in itself is a full time job. Presumably, the problem will not be eased by the addition of the audience analyst projected in the 1958 fiscal budget. In view of KUMONK's evaluation of PBCHORD as one of the best sources of positive information on the USSR, it would seem justifiable to place [ ] in a position where his normal duties would coincide more closely with Headquarter's requirements.

B. Location is a problem because the information value of the Evaluation Branch is considerably smaller than that which exists in other departments. Natural access and processing environment are lacking. This problem might be solved by a private office or by moving [ ] in with [ ] Space is a problem, here as elsewhere, however.

C. Ideally, the best solution would be to reassign [ ] to a position with natural access to information from all PBCHORD offices: namely - in [ ] office, or possibly as an assistant to [ ]. Of the two, a special assistant to [ ] would be the better, since close coordination with his office with regard to use of the telex, etc. is envisioned as the best method of handling much of the material. Also, information requirements would be better protected security-wise in coming from [ ] office.

D. In the interim, and since ideal solutions are seldom possible, it may be necessary to make [ ] at least, witting of [ ] relation to KUBARK in order to facilitate the daily flow of information for processing. [ ] is loath to do this, however, since it will certainly result in several unwitting people being involved in view of the amount of material. [ ] lack of natural access to the monitoring material can probably be taken care of by an appropriate cover story, however.

4. The above was discussed with [ ] and he concurs in the need for placing [ ] in a position more suitable to serving his information collection duties. The decision basically must be made at Headquarters of course. The potential is here beyond any doubt. [ ] and others of KUMONK have expressed the opinion that PBCHORD represents one of the best sources of information of value to them on the USSR. Budgetary consideration, therefore, should include the funds to exploit this potential in terms of monitoring personnel, one or more publications review persons, translation personnel and personnel to interview the vast pools of repatriates in Spain and Greece as well as Soviet travellers now appearing in the West in increasing numbers. The relationship of such additional personnel to Headquarters information requirements as well as PBCHORD requirements is obvious.

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SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT B to EGMA-32633

Identify A: Foreign Documents Division

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SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT B to EXMA-32633

Identify As Foreign Documents Division

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SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT C TO EGMA 32633  
C O P Y

February 6, 1958

MEMORANDUM TO: Institute Advisor

FROM: Counselor on Institute Relations

SUBJECT: Harvard Russian Research Center's Conference

A graduate of the Harvard Russian Research Center, working for RL here, went to its reunion conference which took place towards the end of January. I asked him to scout around for opinions on the Institute and here is what he found out:

The Institute was mentioned by Professor Mosely in his speech, <sup>He</sup> said that there should be closer contact between U S scholars and the Institute, even though at present the Institute has much less to contribute than it did several years ago.

In private conversations with several persons it was claimed that whereas several years ago the Institute had a unique value as a repository of recent personal experiences in the USSR this value has now greatly diminished because:

- a) The new emigres have become old emigres not having been in the USSR for some fifteen years. They do not understand the great changes that have taken place since the mid 1940's.
- b) Foreign scholars now visit the USSR and see things for themselves; it is likely that in the near future prolonged visits will be possible.
- c) Members of the Institute have not been engaged in serious scholarly activity, relying for the most part on limited personal experiences, by now obsolete.
- d) The Institute failed to establish contact with the scholarly world. E.g. no outside (American) contributions appear in the Vestnik.

The Institute, however, can be revitalized, provided it establishes close contact with outside scholars, and provided also that its members are recruited on the basis of scholarly competence (and not "racial quotas" as one professor put it), and that the staff of the Institute realize that their work must be of the same scholarly caliber as that of other men in the field.

His remarks which represent a consensus of opinion he was able to bring together through informal contacts propound some of the views of Russian emigre scholars of the old school who mill in or around Harvard. Nevertheless a number of his points are well taken and provide food for thought.

/s/ Jaan Pennar

cc: Messrs. Goldstein  
Sargeant